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THE CHALLENGING AUTHORITY OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS:
FROM COLD WAR LEGAL DIPLOMACY
TO THE BRIGHTON DECLARATION AND
BACKLASH
MIKAEL RASK MADSEN*
I
INTRODUCTION
History is a key context for understanding the authority of the European
1
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court). This half-century old international
court (IC) has operated in contexts as different as the Cold War and
decolonization, the emergence of the political and economic process of
European integration, the post–Cold War period and, most recently, the
geopolitical power shift that has prompted new transnational projects and
alliances beyond Europe. The ECtHR’s long period of operation and the
different socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions under which it has evolved
are also reflected in the institutional evolution of the Court from a traditional,
nonpermanent IC that met occasionally in smaller premises to a permanent
court proudly perched on the River Ill in Strasbourg, France. Moreover, the
ECtHR has changed from being the product of a Cold War political
compromise to a high-profile and influential IC with de facto supreme
2
jurisdiction over European human rights.
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1. See generally ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(2010); A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE
GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (2004); MIKAEL RASK MADSEN, LA GENÈSE DE
L’EUROPE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: ENJEUX JURIDIQUES ET STRATÉGIES D’ETAT (FRANCE,
GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET PAYS SCANDINAVES, 1945–1970) (2010).
2. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court:
The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics,
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The Court’s transformation has contributed to an explosive growth in its
caseload, most notably since 2000. In its first decade of operation, 1959 to 1969,
the Court delivered ten judgments; in 2008, the ECtHR delivered its ten3
thousandth judgment. Its current docket includes some 70,000 pending
4
applications and it delivered 891 judgments in 2014 alone. Thus, when
examined solely at the level of institutional and legal development, the ECtHR
has undergone a wholesale metamorphosis—a development that its advocates
and architects could hardly have anticipated.
This article uses the theoretical framework laid out by Alter, Helfer, and
Madsen to analyze the transformation of the authority of the ECtHR since its
5
genesis. Their framework lays out a set of different types of authority in fact:
6
from narrow, to intermediate, to extensive authority. The extent to which a
court’s constituencies recognize IC decisions as binding and take consequential
7
steps to implement those decisions reflects the type of authority an IC wields.
8
Narrow authority concerns the immediate parties of a given case. Intermediate
authority concerns the larger group of actors similarly situated to the parties of
a given case, such as potential litigants and government officials charged with
9
implementing IC decisions. Extensive authority concerns the broadest range of
actors that engage with the IC—including NGOs, legal professionals,
10
academics, and business actors. An IC with extensive authority will typically
be a key institution in developing law and politics within its area of legal
authority. There is no teleology implied in this theory and different types of
authority can coexist. Also, the authority of the Court can vary across member
states.
From its inception until the mid-to-late 1970s, the ECtHR struggled to
maintain narrow legal authority. The Court’s judgments influenced the litigants
involved in these disputes but did not cast a broader normative shadow beyond
11
the target state and the specific case. The ECtHR’s limited influence was an
artifact of its very small caseload during its first fifteen years of operation and
the reality that key member states of the European Convention on Human
Rights (the Convention or ECHR)—notably France and the United
32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007) (discussing the process that shifted the Court to its current
position as the supreme European human rights court).
3. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERVIEW 1959–2014, 4 (2015), http://www.echr
.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592014_ENG.pdf.
4. This number is current as of December 31, 2014. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 6 (2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2014_ENG.pdf.
5. See generally Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes
the Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 9–12.
6. In their framework, they also include two additional types of authority: no authority and
popular authority. These two types are not considered in this analysis. Id. at 9, 11–12.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 10–11.
11. Id. at 16, tbl. 1.
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Kingdom—were unwilling to accept the Court’s jurisdiction out of fear that it
12
would meddle in the decolonization struggles of the period. The Court
responded by deploying a relatively restrictive and often state-friendly
interpretation of the Convention to facilitate states’ acceptance of the system.
This diplomatic approach to the Convention had, however, the negative
consequence that civil society groups, typically litigation-oriented NGOs, found
13
the Court to be of little use.
Both the Court’s caseload and civil society engagement with the Court
changed throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s when the ECtHR gained
14
intermediate and extensive authority. During this period, the Court, with a
steady and growing docket, became the de facto Supreme Court of human
15
rights in Europe. Even though there were negative reactions to the Court’s
expanding jurisprudence and power—first in the United Kingdom, and then in
16
France —member states generally accepted ECtHR judgments, although
17
compliance was sometimes partial or delayed. Moreover, human rights
emerged not only as a distinct area of European law but also as a broader legal–
political field marked by contests over the meaning and interpretation of human
18
rights as an increasingly important social and legal issue in Europe.
The enlargement of Europe in the late 1990s—which expanded the
Convention’s membership to forty-seven and its geographical reach from
western Europe to the easternmost boundaries of Russia—had a major impact
on the Court and its authority. Most notably, in 1998, the ECtHR was
reconstituted as a permanent IC, and the European Commission on Human
Rights, previously responsible for filtering applications to the Court, was
disbanded. At first, these significant changes did not alter the Court’s approach
to adjudicating human rights cases. The supreme interpreter of the Convention,
the ECtHR, initially continued to pursue the jurisprudential path developed
since the late 1980s for the new eastern European member states. Yet the
combined effects of the institutional transformation and the structural and
systematic human rights problems in several new member states led the Court’s

12. Mikael Rask Madsen, France, the UK and “Boomerang” of the Internationalization of Human
Rights (1945–2000), in HUMAN RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 57, 63 (Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2004).
13. See MADSEN, supra note 1, at 178–79.
14. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5.
15. See Madsen, supra note 2, at 155 (providing an overall analysis of the construction of the new
and permanent Court in 1998).
16. For further discussion, see Madsen, supra note 12, at 77, 82.
17. Insiders to the ECtHR system at this time generally claim that there was nearly total
compliance. See SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 218 n.9 (2014) (“[M]ost of the sources that dealt with this issue claim
compliance rates are very high.”).
18. For definition of the field, see PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 97 (1992). See also Mikael Rask Madsen, Reflexivity and the Construction of
the International Object: The Case of Human Rights, 259 INT’L POL. SOCIOLOGY 263–64 (2011).
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19

caseload to skyrocket. The ECtHR could not diffuse its interpretation of
human rights to lower courts in the same way a constitutional or national
supreme court might; instead, the ECtHR was forced to serve as the final court
of appeal for the protection of the individual human rights of more than 800
20
million Europeans.
With the Court increasingly overburdened and backlogged—yet still
progressively expanding the scope of the Convention—a number of member
states launched, for the first time since the Court’s creation in 1959, a systematic
critique of both the Court’s power over national law and politics and the quality
21
of the Court’s judges and their judgments. This discontent climaxed with the
2012 Brighton Declaration, adopted by all forty-seven member states, which
22
began an institutionalized process that aimed to limit the ECtHR’s power. The
process before and after the Brighton Declaration raises the fundamental
question of whether the overall authority of the Court has changed. Although
more exacerbated in the case of the ECtHR, the situation somewhat resembles
that of the Court of Justice of the EU—another European IC created in an
entirely different historical context that, like the ECtHR, also faces a problem
in terms of eliciting respect for its rulings in a number of Eastern European
countries. In both cases these implementation problems have in turn spurred
23
criticism also in the original member states.
This article analyzes the transformations of the Court’s authority by
emphasizing on one hand the broader historical context of its development—
notably changes at the geopolitical level—and, on the other hand, the
institutional and constituent-specific contexts influencing the Court’s authority.
Because of the size of this empirical object, the analysis cannot be exhaustive
and is instead based on a combination of structural analysis of the broader
geopolitical context, that is, the overriding global frameworks of power, and the
ideas that influence and enable actions in both ICs and in regional and national
settings; more pointed case studies of important member states; and analysis of
significant changes in the institutional design of the ECtHR. The focal point of
19. See infra Part III.
20. This spurred a debate among scholars and judges on the precise role of the ECtHR in terms of
providing constitutional justice or individual justice. For an overview, see Steven Greer & Luzius
Wildhaber, Revisiting the Debate about ‘Constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human Rights, 12
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 665 (2012).
21. JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN & MIKAEL R. MADSEN, Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present
and Future of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 230, 239 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2013).
22. BRIGHTON DECLARATION, APR. 20, 2012, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton
_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf. However, the Brighton Declaration is ambiguous. See CHRISTOFFERSON
& MADSEN, supra note 21, at 230 (arguing that the Brighton Declaration both limits and extends the
power of the Court); Laurence R. Helfer, The Burdens and Benefits of Brighton, 1 ESIL REFLECTIONS
1 (2012) (also arguing that the Brighton Declaration points affects the power of the Court in
contrasting ways).
23. See R. Daniel Kelemen, The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First
Century, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 127–39 (demonstrating that a number of
European countries are only partly in compliance with the rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU).
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the analysis is the changing authority of the ECtHR as a result of both broader
structural changes and country-specific interfaces with the Court. Geopolitics
set the parameters for the action and reforms of the ECtHR, but the Court’s
specific authority—and particularly the unevenness of the Court’s authority
across member states—is for the most part a product of the more local politics.
Addressing the ECtHR’s ever-evolving authority, part II analyzes the long
Cold War period from 1950 through 1989 during which the ECtHR transitioned
into a powerful international court. Part III then turns to the post–Cold War
period from 1989 to the present, first analyzing the increasing number of
judgments handed down by the Court, and then examining the possible new
directions of the Court against the background of its recent criticism.
II
THE ECTHR DURING THE COLD WAR (1950–1989)
Scholars have argued that European governments embraced the Convention
and the ECtHR, in part, to “lock in” liberal democratic ideals into the Western
24
European form of government. But although defending Free Europe was a
25
key driver in the drafting of the Convention, states generally assumed that the
26
cost of ratifying the treaty was low. Indeed, the original Convention provided a
flimsy padlock that was easily broken: ratification did not require accepting the
ECtHR’s jurisdiction or the right of individual petitions, through which
27
individuals could submit claims to European Commission of Human Rights.
Instead, both features, which later became trademarks of the European human
rights regime, were optional at the time. The judicialization of the Convention
depended, therefore, on each state’s acceptance of these optional provisions.
The optional nature of important parts of the agreement—introduced as a
necessary compromise during negotiation of the European human rights
system—deeply influenced the authority and practices of the ECtHR until the
28
mid-1970s. Only after all major member states had accepted these optional
review provisions did the Court begin to acquire broader authority, analyzed
below.
24. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 228 (2000) (arguing that the Court was created to “‘lock in’ democratic
governance against future opponents”).
25. See Marco Duranti, Curbing Labour’s Totalitarian Temptation: European Human Rights Law
and British Postwar Politics, 3 HUMANITY: AN INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS., HUMANITARIANISM, AND DEV.
361, 362 (2012) (“[T]hose founding the European human rights regime were exclusively concerned with
the dangers of communism and fascism.”).
26. See Madsen, supra note 2, at 140.
27. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 25, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Convention_ENG
.pdf [hereinafter Convention].
28. See Mikael Rask Madsen, Legal Diplomacy—Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar
European Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A CRITICAL HISTORY 62,
75–79 (Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann ed. 2011) (showing how this forced the institutions to develop a very
cautious approach to the Convention).
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As originally designed, European states could choose to only accept the
jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial institution, the European Commission of Human
29
Rights. Under the Commission’s jurisdiction, the right of individual petition
was optional, and ratifying the Convention only resulted in the Commission’s
30
compulsory jurisdiction over interstate complaints. Further weakening the
legal dimension of the system, the recommendations of the Commission were
31
not legally binding unless the Committee of Ministers accepted them. Thus,
recommendations were principally controlled by an interstate political body
32
rather than an independent legal body. The Commission, however, had the
power to bring a case before the Court if the state in question had accepted the
33
Court’s jurisdiction and the case could not be settled by conciliation.
Individuals had no such option, whereas states could choose to refer a case to
34
the Court if they had accepted its jurisdiction. As a result of this institutional
design, the Commission rather than the Court initially became the key
institution in the European human rights system. By filtering applications and
deciding which cases to review on the merits or refer to the ECtHR, the
Commission became the central Strasbourg institution and therefore a critical
35
player in building the system’s authority. In what follows, this article first
analyzes the period of narrow authority (1953–1974) that resulted from both
institutional design and the structural limitations imposed by the Cold War and
decolonization. It then addresses the subsequent period (1975–1989) in which
the Court broadened its authority by laying the foundations of European
human rights law and establishing itself as the region’s de facto supreme court
of human rights.
A. The Fragile Human Rights System in Search of Authority (1950–1974)
Ratified by ten member states, the Convention became legally binding in
36
1953. In 1955, a number of smaller countries—Sweden, Ireland, Denmark,
Iceland, and Belgium, along with the Federal Republic of Germany—accepted
37
the provision on individual petition. By 1958, the necessary eight optional
acceptances of the Court’s jurisdiction had been submitted, once again by a
group of smaller countries: Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Austria, and Iceland, together with the Federal Republic of

29. Convention, supra note 27, art. 46.
30. Id. art. 25.
31. Id. art. 31.
32. The Committee of Ministers also oversaw respondent states’ implementation of decisions by
the Court and Commission. See id. art. 32.
33. Id. art. 48.
34. Id.
35. See notes 56—61 and accompanying text.
36. The original ten member states of the European Convention were: The United Kingdom,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Saar, and Sweden.
37. See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21.
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38

Germany. It was the support of smaller European countries that ensured the
initial establishment of the Convention’s oversight system. Conversely, the two
major European imperial powers, France and Britain, which together with Italy
39
had the greatest influence on the drafting of the Convention, both initially
abstained from accepting the right of individual petition and the jurisdiction of
the Court. Moreover, the fact that states assenting to these optional clauses
typically did so only for three or five years at a time combined with the
reluctance of key member states to commit to a European-level review of their
40
human rights practices, put the entire system in a fragile situation.
Consequently, both the Commission and the nascent Court needed to prove
themselves to reticent governments in order to secure the institutions’
continuous operation.
For a new, fragile human rights system in search of authority, the first cases
to reach Strasbourg were hardly ideal. Filed in 1955, the Commission’s first
41
case, Greece v. United Kingdom, was an interstate dispute between two North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, Greece and the United Kingdom,
at the height of both the Cold War and decolonization. The issue involved the
rights of Greek insurgents in Cyprus. Britain had extended the reach of the
Convention to cover some of its colonial possessions, including Cyprus, yet by
not accepting individual petition or the Court’s jurisdiction, it was assumed by
42
the Foreign Office that this extension was a merely symbolic gesture. Greece’s
interstate complaint effectively bypassed this careful British evasion of the
Convention system. Coming to terms with being sued by a NATO ally, the U.K.
Foreign Office eventually defended its actions as a necessary response to the
emergency situation on the island. The Commission resultantly investigated
43
both the alleged violations and the emergency situation.
The ambiguity in what role European human rights should play, and the
recognition—or lack thereof—by member states, is strikingly clear from Greece
v. United Kingdom. In response to the imminent investigation by the
Commission, the British Foreign Office analyzed every member of the
Commission delegation. Although this assessment was only for internal use, it
clearly revealed the British officials’ disdain for the nascent system. Although
Waldock of the United Kingdom and Professor Sørensen of Denmark both
received favorable reviews as “the only members of real caliber,” practically
44
every other Commission member was regarded with scorn. For example, the
38. Id.
39. See generally SIMPSON, supra note 1.
40. A. H. Robertson, The European Court of Human Rights, 9 AM. J. COMP. LAW 1, 18 n.49
(1960).
41. See generally Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, 2 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174
(1959) (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.).
42. See SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 838–41 (discussing the relathionship between extending the
Convention yet limiting access to use the Convention).
43. Convention, supra note 27, art.15.
44. See SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 941.
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Italian Dominedo was described as “garrulous and rather ridiculous individual,”
and the French Pernot as “quite capable of supporting the British case in the
morning, the Greek in the afternoon, and a compromise of his own making in
45
the evening.”
And then there was the question of decolonization and Cold War politics.
Icelander Jonasson in particular was singled out as not only “NATO’s enemy
[number one]” but also as “impetuous, obstinate, and ambitious. He is, like all
Icelanders, an anti-colonialist and very idealistic about anything which does not
46
concern him or Iceland. We fear he will vote for Human Rights.” In practice,
the Foreign Office used its intelligence to sabotage the Commission’s visit to
Cyprus, on numerous occasions allowing only Sørensen and a few others access
47
to files and facilities. But when British efforts seemingly failed to avoid an
embarrassing showdown in Strasbourg with this cast of apparently unfriendly
European jurists, the United Kingdom eventually solved the case by
48
diplomacy. In 1959, Britain gave up its colony, and no further action was called
49
for in Strasbourg—a result viewed with some relief by all parties.
Also in 1959, the ECtHR was finally ready to receive cases. Mirroring the
Commission’s experience, the Court’s became embroiled in high politics in its
50
first dispute. The 1959 Lawless case concerned the practice of detention
without trial in Ireland during an IRA insurgency, a matter also of British
51
interest. The European Commission and the Court both found that the
52
practice violated Article 5 of the ECHR. Yet the Court also found that the
Irish Government was acting in conformity with the Convention because, under
53
the treaty’s derogation clause, the “life of the nation” was threatened.
Although the outcome of the case once again pleased governments, the Court
nevertheless asserted the power to decide precisely when such situations of
emergency existed—a small but important step for the Court.
The Irish and Greek cases are illustrative of the legal–diplomatic nature of
the Convention system at this point in time. The Court and Commission had to
strike a fine balance between developing the Convention and simultaneously
persuading reluctant governments of the institutions’ sensitivities to complex
54
domestic sociopolitical contexts. Both the Commission and the Court found

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 991.
48. Id. at 1049–52.
49. G.A. Res. 59/32 (Dec. 1, 2004).
50. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 3 (1960) (“[I]n his Application
that there has been a violation of the Convention in his case, by the authorities of Ireland, inasmuch as
he was detained without trial.”).
51. See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 2.
52. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B).
53. Convention, supra note 27, art. 15.
54. See generally The Greek Case, App. No. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, 1969 Eur.
Conv. on H.R. 1 (1970); see also Madsen, supra note 28, at 78–79.
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violations in very few cases and gained the image of being minimalistic and even
55
state-friendly in their operations. Statistically, the Commission played a
significant gatekeeping role; it decided whether or not to refer an individual
56
complaint to the Court. Through this structure, the Commission in part
57
controlled the development of the Court’s jurisprudence. Equally important
was the Commission’s power to screen applications. Of the 713 individual
complaints received by the Commission from July of 1955 to March of 1960, 710
58
were rejected. During the next decade only fifty-four cases were declared
59
admissible out of some 3,600 applications. And of this small number of
admitted cases, the Commission found violations of the Convention in only a
60
handful. Consequently, among potential litigants, the Commission gained a
61
reputation for dismissing cases.
The situation at the Court was even more striking. During its first decade of
62
operation, 1959 through 1969, the Court was involved only in ten cases. In fact,
63
after the Lawless and De Becker cases, the Court was practically without work
during the mid-1960s, which led some to question whether it should be shut
64
down due to inactivity. Only toward the end of the decade did the Court
slowly start gaining renewed public and political prominence. When the
governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands
simultaneously filed interstate complaints for very serious violations of the
65
Convention against the Greek colonels who had seized power in Greece, the
66
system’s role as the guardian of freedom was symbolically reinstated. The case
received significant press coverage and ended with the withdrawal of Greece
67
from the Council of Europe. It also showed, however, that the balance
55. Madsen, supra note 28, at 76.
56. Convention, supra note 27, art. 48.
57. Member states that had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court could equally appeal to the
Court. See id.
58. Gordon L. Weil, Decisions on Inadmissible Applications by the European Commission of
Human Rights, 54 THE AM. J. OF INT’L LAW 874, 880 (1960).
59. MARK JANIS, RICHARD KAY & ANTHONY BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
TEXTS AND MATERIALS 25 (2000).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Madsen, supra note 28, at 74.
63. De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, 59 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 214 (1962).
64. See, e.g., Henri Rolin, Has the European Court of Human Rights a Future, 11 HOWARD L.J.
442 (1965). This led to discussions of new competences of the Court. For example, Protocol No. 2 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 44, Sept. 21,
1970, conferred upon the ECtHR the power to give advisory opinions.
65. See generally The Greek Case, App. No. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, 1969 Eur.
Conv. on H.R. 1 (1970).
66. MIKAEL RASK MADSEN, The Protracted Institutionalisation of the Strasbourg Court: From
Legal Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 43, 53 (Mikael Rask Madsen & Jonas Christoffersen eds., 2011).
67. As Shai Dothan has argued, it is hard to imagine a similar scenario to the earlier case of
Lawless, when the Court was much weaker, and the opposition and member states were much stronger.
See DOTHAN, supra note 17.
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between internationally legalized human rights and Cold War political
objectives created divisions within the system. Although a number of smaller
countries with strong democratic records used the Greek case to advocate for
an idealist approach to human rights, the larger member states—notably the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany—were reluctant because they feared
68
that isolating Greece would jeopardize the Greek commitment to NATO.
Jurisprudential developments also surfaced behind this cloud of Cold War
69
politics. The 1968 Belgian Linguistics case was the first case in which the
ECtHR found a violation of the Convention, although by a highly divided eightto-seven vote. It nevertheless signaled that a majority of the judges were ready
70
to give Convention rights and freedoms an effet utile.
Considering both the number of applications as well as the diversity of
applicants from states to individuals during this early period, there is little doubt
that relevant legal constituencies were aware of both the Court and the
Commission. Yet the European human rights system was not highly esteemed
in all camps. Because of system’s reluctance to admit cases or to find violations,
71
lawyers and activists generally saw little use in going to Strasbourg. The
obvious spokesmen for the Convention—the part-time judges and
commissioners in Strasbourg—were only haphazard advocates for the system
72
when fulfilling their national roles. Finally, the judgments of the ECtHR were
so fragmented and specific that most member states and lawyers did not
consider them as having an effect beyond the litigating parties—the definition
73
of narrow authority in the model of Alter, Helfer, and Madsen’s framework.
The system also suffered from a number of external structural limitations.
First, the broader geopolitical contexts in which it operated—the Cold War and
decolonization—were not conducive to establishing authority because they put
key member states, notably the United Kingdom and France, in highly complex
political situations. Second, the very notion of human rights law was ambiguous
and was more often associated with politics than law, partly as a consequence of
74
the linkage between international human rights and the Cold War, and partly
68. In fact, the Greek junta benefited more generally from Western support, including U.S.
support, as, out of a pure Cold War logic, the colonels were seen as a guarantee that the country would
not move toward a neutral or pro-Soviet position. See, e.g., ALEXANDROS NAFPIOTIS, BRITAIN AND
THE GREEK COLONELS: ACCOMMODATING THE JUNTA IN THE COLD WAR (2012).
69. See generally Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in
Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, App. No. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64
(1968).
70. Id. “Effet Utile” is the method of understanding international treaties.
71. For details, see Madsen, supra note 1.
72. The civil servants of the ECHR institutions and a group of judges and commissioners were the
main promoters of the system in its initial years of operation. See Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, The
ECHR and the Birth of (European) Human Rights Law as an Academic Discipline, in LAWYERING
EUROPE: EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD 117, 120–21 (Bruno de Witte &
Antoine Vauchez eds., 2013).
73. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5.
74. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Human Rights and the Hegemony of Ideology: European
Lawyers and the Cold War Battle over International Human Rights, in LAWYERS AND THE
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because many European legal systems did not have a developed human rights
jurisprudence. These structural limitations resulted in a Court that attracted
complaints but had only narrow authority as it failed to cast a legal shadow
beyond particular case-by-case interventions.
B. The Emergence of the ECtHR as a Powerful International Court (1975–
1989)
The Court’s limited role and authority changed over the following fifteen
years, rapidly metamorphosing the Court from a paper tiger to a court with real
teeth and both intermediate and extensive authority. In this process, the initial
minimalistic approach of the Strasbourg system paradoxically constituted an
advantage. Major European powers’ failure to fully accept the jurisdiction of
the Court and the right of individual petition had turned the institutionalization
of the ECtHR into a “game of cat and mouse” in which the Court was being
75
dragged around by the member states. Although the immediate consequence
of this limited external recognition of the ECtHR was its fragility as institution
and limited legal shadow, the Court’s minimalistic approach to the Convention
also had a positive side effect: more and more governments accepted the Court
and the individual petition because they simply did not fear the Court’s
76
influence. The United Kingdom did so for three years starting in 1966 based
77
on precisely such an assessment. This assessment was not unique to Britain—
in 1973, both Italy and Switzerland followed suit. The next year, in the
aftermath of President Pompidou’s sudden death and with the fading memory
of the war in Algeria, France finally ratified the Convention and accepted the
Court’s jurisdiction, although individual petition was accepted only much later,
78
in 1981. The democratization of Greece, Portugal, and Spain also brought
these countries into the ECtHR protection system in 1974, 1978, and 1979,
79
respectively.
Three further exogenous factors influenced this expansion of the Court’s
authority. First, the originally limited space for developing the Strasbourg
system was mainly due to geopolitical constraints deriving from Cold War
politics as argued below. That made lawsuits between NATO allies—and
corresponding denunciations of NATO countries as violators of human rights—
very damaging to the collective interest of Western Europe. By the early 1970s,
CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 258 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth eds., 2012)
(demonstrating the close link between early human rights practices and Cold War politics); see also
HOWARD TOLLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS: GLOBAL ADVOCATES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 34 (1994).
75. Anthony Lester, The European Court of Human Rights after 50 Years, in THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 98, 100 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael
Rask Madsen eds., 2011).
76. MADSEN, supra note 66, at 51–52.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. The only countries that had accepted neither the individual petition nor the Court were
Turkey, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus.

MADSEN_2-8 (DO NOT DELETE)

152

2/8/2016 7:22 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79: 141

however, the Cold War seemed to be in retreat; détente politics became the
name of the game. Second, decolonization was virtually over by the early 1970s,
at least for the larger colonial possessions, which made the international
80
positions of France and the United Kingdom much less at risk. A structural
change in human rights discourse also occurred around this time, with the focus
of the discourse moving from the practices of European imperial powers to
other perpetrators such as military dictatorships in Latin America, the
81
apartheid regime in South Africa, and Eastern Europe’s Helsinki Process. A
third factor that influenced the ECtHR during this period was European
integration. Whereas the initial Strasbourg jurisprudence was very case specific,
after 1975, the idea of a Europe of common standards made its entrance as an
82
additional justification for more progressive human rights developments. The
standards in question were, however, not the common-market ideas of the
European Community but values derived from sociopolitical developments of
the more permissive and less patriarchal society that was taking form in many
83
European countries. In other words, changes in geopolitics opened up a new
space for developing a jurisprudence that sought to couple European human
rights with intra-European societal developments.
The ECtHR’s burgeoning power during this period is immediately apparent
from its legal practices. The jurisprudence of the last half of the 1970s set a new
tone—a dynamic championing of European human rights—that was very
different from the self-constrained legal diplomacy of the previous period. In a
series of landmark decisions, the Court fundamentally transformed European
human rights from a project mainly linked to Cold War objectives to both an
independent mission of setting common standards across Europe and a quest
84
for a real protection of human rights under the ECHR.
In the late 1970s, the framework for this distinctively European protection
of human rights was hammered out in three key cases: Ireland v. the United
85
86
87
Kingdom, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, and Airey v. Ireland. The Irish case
80. See generally DIETMAR ROTHERMUND, THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
DECOLONIZATION (2006); MARTIN SHIPWAY, DECOLONIZATION AND ITS IMPACT: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE END OF THE COLONIAL EMPIRES (2007).
81. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court:
The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics,
32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORY (2010).
82. See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
83. The literature is large on this subject but with regard to its impact on the development of
rights, see particularly STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE (2004).
84. The Court began this new wave of jurisprudence in Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No.
4451/70, 18 Eur.Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1975); National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium App. No. 4464/70
(1975); Handyside v. United Kingdom App. No. 5493/72, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Kjeldsen,
Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark App. No. 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1976).
85. Ireland v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
86. Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A) at 12 (1978).
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offered ECtHR judges a chance to revisit the tricky question of national
emergencies, an issue for which the Court had previously shown great
88
deference to the member states in the Lawless case. The case was a
controversial interstate complaint against the United Kingdom concerning five
89
interrogation techniques used by British security forces in Northern Ireland.
The Court held that these practices could not be justified by merely citing to a
90
national emergency. The Court found that the interrogation techniques in
question violated the nonderogable Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits
inhuman and degrading treatment—a provision that must be respected even in
91
situations of political unrest and violence.
In the same year as Irish, the ECtHR decided Tyrer v. the United Kingdom,
92
a case concerning corporal punishment of an underage pupil. The Court
famously stated that the Convention was “a living instrument . . . [to] be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions . . . and commonly accepted
93
standards in the . . . member states.” This set the stage for the Court’s later use
of a highly controversial, dynamic interpretation of the ECtHR.
The following year, in Airey v. United Kingdom, the Court further extended
its reach by noting that “[t]he Convention is intended to guarantee not rights
94
that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.”
Somewhat similar to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in its
95
formative period, the ECtHR managed to devise a tripartite framework that
96
97
consisted of nonderogable rights,
dynamic interpretation,
and the
requirement of an effective and practical protection of rights by the member
98
states. The decisions were not all unanimous or easily swallowed by the
respondent countries, but they made a strong claim for the Court being the
authoritative interpreter of the Convention.
In 1976, a pattern of growth began in the number of cases under the Court’s
99
review. Figure 1 shows the total number of judgments delivered each year
87. Airey v. Ireland App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (1979); see also Marckx v.
Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) (ruling out distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate children and imposing a positive obligation on member states).
88. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1960).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A) (1978).
93. Id.
94. Airey v. Ireland App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
95. See J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (arguing that in
the foundationa period of European law, from 1958 through mid 1970s, the European Court of Justice
created constitutional framework of consisting of direct effect, supremacy, implied powers, and human
rights).
96. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1960).
97. Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A).
98. Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
99. All data reflected in the tables included in this article have been generated by using the
database at iCourts.
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from 1960 to
o 1989.
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100. During
g this period, in addition to the
e Irish case, therre were three otther interstate ccomplaints:
Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788//60, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 116 (1961), Cyp
prus v. Turkey I-III, App.
Nos. 6780/74 an
nd 6950/75, 2 Eur.
E
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep
p. 125 (1975); A
App. No. 8007/777, 13 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec.
D & Rep. 85 (1983), and Denmark, France, Norway, Swedeen, and the Neth
herlands v.
Turkey, App. No.
N 9940–9944/82
2, 35 Eur. Comm
m’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143 (19833).
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uation of law in Northern
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the broader situ
102. Sunday
y Times v. The United Kingdo
om, App. No. 66538/74, 30 Eurr. Ct. H.R. (serr. A) at 22
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ntion, supra notte 27, art. 5.
103. Conven
104. Id. art. 3.
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cases; and, emblematica
e
ally, Soering v. the Uniteed Kingdom,, in which th
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aligned itsellf with popu
ular Europea
an sentimentts against caapital punish
hment to
hold that ex
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d violate Artticle 3 of thee ECHR
if the appliccant would face
f
the dea
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hat is, the em
motional
105
distress felt by prisonerss on death ro
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human rights law played practically no role in domestic Danish law and
108
politics. Cases brought against Denmark were summarily dismissed, with only
limited exceptions, for which no violations were found. Equally important, the
Danish government concluded that very few legislative revisions were required
to conform Danish and European human rights standards—with the exception
of securing a minimum level of protection of the (negative) freedom of
association within respect to “closed-shop” unions due to the Court’s ruling in
Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom. Not until 1989, in the Hauschildt
109
case concerning impartiality of single-judge provincial courts in criminal
proceedings, was Denmark found to be in breach of the Convention. The
ECHR was long viewed mainly as a tool for the country’s international
engagement. Illuminatingly, Denmark once again joined forces in 1982 with the
other Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, and France in another interstate
110
complaint, this time against Turkey. And this perception of the ECHR was
not unique to Denmark. Other states party to the Convention continued to
regard the Strasbourg system as a positive but distant institution, essentially
111
international and therefore of little domestic importance.
In stark contrast to Denmark, the United Kingdom became “the most
112
regular customer in Strasbourg” throughout the 1980s. Although there had
113
been some warnings in the two interstate cases involving Cyprus and
114
115
116
Ireland, as well as the individual petition cases of Golder, Tyrer, and
117
Airey, it was still assumed in the Foreign Office that the United Kingdom’s
relationship to international human rights was that of exporting legal norms
118
rather than importing them. Yet as a consequence of the ECtHR’s multiple
findings of U.K. violations of the Convention—twenty-two from 1975 to 1989—
the continuous acceptance of “the right to individual petition came up as a real
119
question” at the highest political level. Emblematic of the situation at the
courts in criminal proceedings).
107. See generally Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen, The End of Virtue? Denmark and
the Internationalisation of Human Rights, 80 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 257 (2011).
108. Id. (arguing that European human rights was practically dealt with as matter of foreign policy).
109. Hauschildt, 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
110. Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands v. Turkey, App. No. 9940–9944/82,
35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143 (1983).
111. See, e.g., Malcolm Langford & Johan Karlsson Schaffer, The Nordic Human Rights Paradox,
(Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper, No. 2013-35, 2014).
112. Interview with Senior Legal Advisor in the British Foreign Office, conducted on May 8 2001
by author.
113. Cyprus v. Turkey I-III, App. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125;
App. No. 8007/77 (1975).
114. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1960).
115. Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur.Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1975).
116. Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A) (1978).
117. Airey v. Ireland App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
118. See generally Madsen, supra note 12, at 80–82.
119. Interview with Senior Legal Advisor in the British Foreign Office, conducted on May 8, 2001
by author. The 1966 U.K. decision to accept the jurisdiction of both the European Court and
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time—and in sharp contrast to the current conservative British government—
the Thatcher government’s response was that “the U.K. was not to pull out, but
120
the Court to pull back.” But behind the critical public rhetoric, the United
Kingdom generally took consequential steps to implement lost cases in
Strasbourg as well as take proactive steps to more generally comply with
121
European human rights norms. The one exception was Brogan and Others v.
122
United Kingdom, in which the ECtHR found that the long detention period
permitted by the British Prevention of Terrorism Act violated Article 5(3).
After expressing anger and sympathy for the victims of terrorism in the House
of Commons, Thatcher announced that Britain would refuse to accept the
123
judgment and would derogate from certain provisions of the Convention.
In more institutional terms, the British government’s frequent interaction
with Strasbourg had significant consequences. First, it resulted in human rights
being “domesticated” and the British Home Office increasingly took over from
124
its Foreign Office. Another important consequence was that the U.K.–
Strasbourg interaction triggered the development of specialized human rights
125
lawyers in the United Kingdom, a unique situation in Europe at the time.
Much of this legal activism was directly linked either to the conflict in Northern
Ireland or to the increasing rift between the British left and the Thatcher
government regarding the protection of civil and political rights, such as the
126
rights to strike, assemble, or protest. In other words, whereas geopolitics had
enabled the ECtHR to pursue a different interpretive strategy since the mid1970s, it was domestic feuds that fueled the making of a distinct British human
rights environment in the 1980s—an environment that would have influence
127
beyond the British Isles.
The legal establishment, however, was initially averse to using the ECHR.
As one prolific human rights barrister recalled, “It was distinctively seen as

Commission only ran for a specified renewable period until the incorporation into British law of the
Convention by the 1998 Human Rights Act. See supra text accompanying note 40; see also Human
Rights Act of 1998 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents.
120. Interview with Senior Legal Advisor in the British Foreign Office, conducted on May 8, 2001
by author.
121. Madsen, supra note 12, at 81.
122. Brogan and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84; 11266/84; 11386/85, 11 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 117 (1988).
123. K.D. EWING & CONOR A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
MODERN BRITAIN 224–25 (1990).
124. Madsen, supra note 12, at 81.
125. To use the case of Denmark again, only one Danish lawyer specialized in the field, and his
practice covered all of Scandinavian human rights. See Mikael Rask Madsen, L’Emergence d’un champ
des droits de l’homme dans les pays européens: enjeux professionnels et stratégies d’Etat au carrefour du
droit et de la politique (France, Grande-Bretagne et pays scandinaves, 1945–2000) (2005) (unpublished
Ph.D Dissertation, l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales) (on file with author).
126. See generally EWING & GEARTY, supra note 123.
127. Some NGOs—for example, the National Council of Civil Liberties and JUSTICE—date back
much longer, but they only started investing in the ECtHR in the 1980s. See Madsen, supra note 12, at
82.
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unfashionable to use the ECHR . . . even treacherous . . . one was seen as being
in the last ditch or in a hopeless case if you referred to it . . . I was perceived as a
128
maverick that had an obsession that was un-British . . . .” But with the
entrepreneurial efforts of a handful of key barristers, the situation was quickly
reversed and these human rights lawyers went on to repeatedly secure victories
129
against their home state in Strasbourg. Unsurprisingly, roughly half of the
cases against the United Kingdom during the period in focus involved
130
specialized human rights NGOs.
Due to these and other developments, Britain became the frontier in which
the ECtHR acquired intermediate and extensive authority. That is, the United
Kingdom was the first member state in which the Court had a real, immediate,
and continuous domestic importance as well as a broader audience. Although
the strengthened respect for, and pursuit of, human rights in the United
Kingdom had no real counterpart in other member states, it had some presence
in academia on the continent, where law schools had started to integrate
131
European human rights into the curriculum. Human rights centers, most often
established on the fringes of legal academia, were an additional innovation of
the 1980s. In Britain, the pioneers were at Essex University, which hosted key
132
professors and litigators of European human rights. In other countries,
notably in Scandinavia, well-funded human rights centers were also set up, but,
in line with the general view of human rights as an “export good,” they took a
133
broader global perspective. Internally focused human rights centers required
134
more time to take root.
The state of human rights and ECtHR authority during this period is best
labeled, due to the varied state of human rights across member states, as narrow
135
and intermediate authority, with flashes of expansive authority. There is little
doubt, however, that the late 1980s ushered in a new era of broader authority
for the ECtHR. This expanded authority was evident in the Court’s increasingly
packed docket, general impact on human rights, and ability to spur broader
136
interest in the field. Although a situation similar to the United Kingdom’s
increasingly intense interface with the ECtHR did not develop in other
137
Convention member states until the 1990s, it was throughout this period that
the ECtHR slowly came to be regarded as the central European human rights

128. Interview with leading London barrister specializing in human rights (Feb. 26, 2001).
129. For details, see Madsen, supra note 12, at 81.
130. CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW 254–68 (1992).
131. For details, see Madsen, supra note 125.
132. The Essex Human Rights Center would eventually develop into, de facto, the largest human
rights law office in Europe, later being the spearheading into what later was known as the Kurdish
cases. Id. at 554–55.
133. Id. at 358–64
134. Id.
135. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5.
136. See supra fig. 1.
137. See generally Madsen, supra note 2.
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138

III
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN EVER-LARGER EUROPE (1990–2014)
After the end of the Cold War, the ECtHR started generally to deliver a
significantly higher number of judgments per year. Further change occurred
between the periods 1990 through 1999 and 2000 through 2014 as both the rate
of applications to the Court and the Court’s output expanded substantially after
139
2000. The Court continued its trend of the 1980s until about 1999 with a
steady increase in the number of judgments, from around thirty in 1991 to 177
140
in 1999. Between 2000 and 2014, this trend accelerated. The Court issued 695
141
judgments in 2000 and 1,624 in 2009. The number dropped to 891 rulings in
142
2014. The drop in the annual number of judgments beginning in 2011,
however, is a relative one as it is a product of change in policy at Strasbourg to
143
join cases such that more applications are listed in a single judgment. In 2013
and 2014, for example, the Court judged 3,661 and 2,388 applications but
144
delivered only 916 and 891 judgments, respectively. The year 2013 had the
highest figure ever in terms of number of applications judged. Figure 3 provides
the number of judgments delivered each year during the period from 1990 to
2014. The two periods (1990–1999; 2000–2014) are indicated with different
shading.

138. Id. at 154–55.
139. See infra fig. 3. The period after 2000 is marked with darker coloring.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. The use of so-called pilot judgments on test cases, general measures, and a 2009 priority policy
has also influenced output. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS
2011 4–5, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2012_ENG.pdf.
144. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013 4 (2014)
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2013_ENG.pdf; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2014 5 (2015) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis
_2014_ENG.pdf.
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thus created a fundamental challenge not only to the high standards set in the
1980s and 1990s but also to the Court’s strategy of spinning an expansive and
147
tighter normative web of European human rights.
Closely related to the challenges the massive member state intake
precipitated, a major overhaul of the system’s institutional design provides
additional context to explain the increase in the Court’s activity described in
Figure 3. With Protocol No. 11’s entry into force in 1998, the ECtHR was
transformed into a permanent IC with compulsory jurisdiction and compulsory
148
right to individual petition. As part of the institutional overhaul, the
Commission was closed down and the supranational protection of human rights
149
in Europe was fully judicialized. Importantly, Protocol No. 11 was not simply
150
the result of the transformation of post–Cold War Europe. In fact, the
negotiation was initiated in 1983 when it became apparent that the Commission
151
had difficulties dealing with what was identified as a serious backlog of cases.
Most of the design choices of Protocol No. 11 were therefore prompted by the
operational contexts of the 1980s and early 1990s. This had the consequence
that the CoE had to draft additional new protocols to adapt the new, single,
permanent court to the operational contexts of the larger Europe which in the
meantime had come under the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. To analyze these
continuous changes in the Court’s authority, in what follows, this article first
traces the authority of the Court from 1990 to approximately 2000 to show the
gradual transition from the original pre–Protocol No. 11 Court into the
permanent Court. It then examines the growing discontent with the permanent
Court and its rapidly growing backlog of cases and how this criticism
culminated around the Brighton Declaration of 2012.
A. Judicializing and Embedding Human Rights in Western Europe (1990–2000)
As indicated by Figure 3 above, the evolution of cases before the ECtHR in
the 1990s follows a steady but limited growth pattern that began in the early
1980s. Although Britain was the main violator of European human rights and
the frontier of the development of the human rights field in the 1980s, other
152
countries led the charge during the 1990s. The United Kingdom saw an
overall decline in relative number of cases in Strasbourg whereas Italy, France,

147. There is a large literature on the interpretive approaches of the Court. See, e.g., Laurence R.
Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 125 (2008).
148. See Convention, supra note 27, art. 19.
149. See Convention, Protocol 11 pmbl., supra note 27 (restructuring the control machinery
established thereby, 1 November 1998).
150. SWEENEY, supra note 145.
151. Robert Harmsen, The Reform of the Convention System: Institutional Restructuring and the
(Geo-)Politics of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND
POLITICS 119, 119 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2011).
152. See supra fig. 3.
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and Turkey became the most frequent respondent states. Figure 4 lists the
percentage of total output of judgments for a representative number of Western
European member states. Figure 4 suggests that France, Italy, and Turkey are
key countries for understanding the ECtHR’s changing authority during the
1990s. Italy and Turkey, although quantitatively the most significant countries
in terms of the number of judgments against them, are actually outliers. The
case of France is more representative of the general transformation of the
Court.
Figure 4
Year

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Austria

10.00%

6.94%

6.17%

15.00%

6.00%

17.86%

6.94%

8.57%

1.89%

1.69%

Belgium

0.00%

6.94%

6.17%

1.67%

4.00%

1.79%

2.78%

2.86%

1.89%

1.13%

Denmark

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

2.00%

0.00%

1.39%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

13.33%

8.33%

14.81%

21.67%

14.00%

23.21%

19.44%

14.29%

25.47%

12.99%

Country

France
Germany

0.00%

1.39%

4.94%

1.67%

4.00%

1.79%

2.78%

2.86%

0.00%

1.69%

Italy

0.00%

52.78%

54.32%

23.33%

10.00%

8.93%

11.11%

19.05%

6.60%

40.11%

Netherlands

16.67%

2.78%

1.23%

5.00%

10.00%

8.93%

6.94%

3.81%

4.72%

1.13%

Switzerland

13.33%

2.78%

1.23%

6.67%

6.00%

1.79%

4.17%

5.71%

4.72%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

5.36%

6.94%

7.62%

16.98%

10.73%

United Kingdom 20.00%

5.56%

3.70%

10.00%

14.00%

14.29%

16.67%

9.52%

9.43%

7.91%

12.50%

7.41%

15.00%

30.00%

16.07%

20.83%

25.71%

28.30%

22.60%

Turkey

Other

26.67%

Italy was an outlier due to the inability of its legal and political system to
respond adequately to the requirements of Article 6, which generated a huge
154
caseload. By the early 2000s, judgments against Italy—due in large part to the
excessive length of Italian trials—accounted for an average of forty-five percent
155
of the total number of judgments delivered by the Court. These cases against
Italy are important as it is the first time the Court had to deal with structural
156
human rights problems. Although the Italian government generally paid the
damages awarded by the ECtHR, the root of the problem—the archaic legal
157
proceedings—was not sufficiently reformed.
153. Id.
154. This was mainly due to the lack of reforms of the judicial system and a reserved attitude
towards the ECtHR by the highest courts. Mercedes Candela Soriano, The Reception Process in Spain
and Italy, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 393,
405 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
155. It subsequently dropped to below ten percent in 2014. For details, see infra app. 1.
156. The question of structural human rights problems arises again below when analyzing the
integration of the new Eastern European member states.
157. See generally Candela Soriano, supra note 154.
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The situation of Italy presented a new challenge for the Court, one the
Court would face continuously during the following decade: that compliance
was increasingly partial and judgments on particular issues seemed to lead to
more, rather than fewer, cases challenging the same structural problems.
Thereby the ECtHR judgments arguably generated more cases than it resolved,
as the underlying structural problems were not fixed. In terms of the Court’s
authority, this created a paradoxical situation of increased mobilization by
litigants paired with relevant state agencies’ insufficient efforts to give effect to
the ECtHR’s rulings. As a result, the Court’s intermediate and extensive
authority increased while its narrow authority decreased.
The plight of democratizing countries presented another new challenge to
the Court as it had to not only monitor but also promote human rights. Turkey
provides an apt illustration of the ECtHR’s authority in this complex context, a
situation that also would become well known to the Court throughout the
2000s. Turkey had accepted individual petition and the Court only in 1987 and
1990 respectively, and cases from Turkey did not appear before the Court until
158
the mid-1990s. The pattern of cases generally reflects Turkey’s distinctive
social, political, and legal problems at that time. These problems included the
contested status of the Kurds, which caused recurrent cases in Strasbourg, and a
set of issues related to the modern Turkish state’s guarantee of basic civil
159
liberties and political freedoms.
In terms of the authority of the ECtHR, the cases from Southeast Turkey
stood out. For the first time, in Aksoy v Turkey, the Court found a respondent
160
state in violation of the prohibition on torture. Violations of Article 3 were
161
also found in a number of other cases involving the Turkish–Kurdish conflict.
Due to these and a steady stream of other human rights cases, the total number
of judgments directly linked to southeast Turkey from 1996 to 2008 was
162
approximately 175 cases, with another 1,500 pending in 2010. This was the
first time the Court was faced with the challenge of gross and systemic human
163
rights violations.
Turkey’s problematic assimilation into the ECHR system reveals two things

158. In addition, there were interstate cases against Turkey in 1974, 1975 and 1977. See supra note 100.
In 1983, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands v. Turkey, App. No. 9940–9944/82,
35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143 (1983). And again in 1997, Denmark v. Turkey, App. No.
34382/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
159. See generally Aisling Reidy, Françoise Hampson & Kevin Boyle, Gross Violations of Human
Rights: Invoking the European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 NETH. Q. HUM.
RTS. 161 (1997).
160. Case of Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996-VI 18 (1996).
161. Rachel Chichowski, Civil Society and the European Court of Human Rights, in THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 77, 89–95 (Jonas
Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2011).
162. Başak Çalı, The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official Acknowledgment,
and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European Court of Human Rights,
1996–2006, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (2010).
163. See generally Reidy, Hampson & Boyle, supra note 159.
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about the changing authority of the ECtHR. First, most of the Kurdish cases
would most likely never have been filed were it not for systematic lawyering
164
facilitated in part by veteran British human rights lawyers. This suggests a
linkage between the pioneering human rights constituents in Britain and the
165
broadening of the ECtHR’s authority. Second, comparing the situations in
Turkey and Italy foregrounds the sociopolitical reality that the Court serves
very different functions in these two countries, ranging from the more technical
modernization of the Italian judiciary to the democratization of Turkey. The
ECtHR’s authority with respect to Turkey is also distinctive because the
relevant government agencies have shown little recognition of the Court’s
rulings in terms of implementing them. Of the approximately 2,400 cases
decided against Turkey between 1987 and 2001, of which eighty-seven percent
found at least one violation, around 1,700 judgments were not fully
166
implemented as of 2012. This strongly indicates the Court’s limited narrow
and intermediate authority in Turkey. Yet the fact that so many cases are
directed to Strasbourg suggests conversely the emergence of a legal field in
which the European Convention and the ECtHR are increasingly accepted
among many audiences as a tool for legal and social change even though some
government agents continue to resist it.
In the bigger picture of the evolution of the ECtHR, however, Turkey and
Italy are both outliers; France is a far more representative case of how the
ECtHR generally developed extensive authority in many European countries
throughout the 1990s. France fully entered the ECHR only in 1981, and the first
167
judgments against France were not delivered until the mid-1980s. One of the
key agents, la Cour de Cassation, the highest French court on civil and criminal
168
matters, originally sought to integrate the ECtHR into its practices. An
estimated 700 French decisions explicitly referring to the ECHR were issued
between 1987 and 1997, and la Cour de Cassation was initially quick to
incorporate the outcomes of cases against France before the ECtHR into its
169
practices. In light of this collaborative mood, the French highest courts were
surprised—if not offended—when the ECtHR began to criticize not only
certain police and administrative practices in France but also the functioning of

164. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
165. See Chichowski, supra note 161, at 89–94 (providing descriptive statistics on this linkage). See
generally LOVEDAY HODSON, NGOS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2011).
166. Başak Çalı, Turkey’s Relationship with the European Court of Human Rights Shows that
Human Rights Courts Play a Vital Role, but One that Can Often Be Vastly Improved, THE LONDON
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (Mar. 14, 2012), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
europpblog/2012/03/14/turkey-echr/.
167. Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad & Anne Weber, The Reception Process in France and
Germany, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 107,
109 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
168. See generally Leslie Goldstein & Cornel Ban, The Rule of Law and the European Human
Rights Regime, Center for the Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program
(Working Paper No. 13, 2003).
169. Id. at 23.
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170

French courts. Counterattacking, the Cour de Cassation launched a rebellion
against the Court in response to the rulings of the ECtHR on the impartiality of
the general advocates of the Cour de Cassation—a similar situation would occur
with regard to the Commissaires du gouvernement of the Conseil d’État—and a
number of cases on more technical issues related to, for example, standards of
171
interrogation. It was a real rebellion in the sense that the French court
deliberately ignored the relevant ECtHR case law and, in some instances,
ignored the ECtHR cases that had found France to be in violation of the
172
ECHR.
Yet the use of the ECtHR to attack high courts in France simultaneously
spurred an interest among lawyers in challenging the particularities of the
173
French justice system as incompatible with the Convention. The ECtHR
virtually became an appeals court to the supreme French courts; the number of
cases grew steadily and France eventually became one of the three most
174
frequent litigators in Strasbourg. The response from French judges was that
the ECtHR simply failed to grasp the complexity of French justice in the
Court’s pursuit of a superficial and formalist attempt to set uniform European
175
standards. Regardless of rhetoric, there was little doubt that the ECtHR was
becoming both a part of domestic legal reality and a force to be reckoned with
in the French legal field at large.
The French court system was not alone in coming under fire. The politico–
administrative elites also needed to respond to the criticism from Strasbourg,
176
particularly after the 1999 case Selmouni v France, in which France was found
guilty of torture. France was only the second member state that had been found
177
guilty of violating this nonderogable right. This judgment cast a shadow
beyond the legal field and its technical concerns. Selmouni became front-page
news and confirmed that being the cradle of human rights did not automatically
178
also mean being in the avant-garde of human rights.
For French
administrative and political elites, this controversial judgment, combined with
the persistent need for technical reform due to other ECtHR judgments, was a
179
serious challenge. In fact, it required rethinking the French raison d’état

170. Madsen, supra note 12, at 78.
171. J. P. Marguenaud, l’Effectivité des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme en
France, 24 J. DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 1, 1–12 (2001).
172. Lambert Abdelgawad & Weber, supra note 167, at 129.
173. Id.
174. See supra fig. 3.
175. Madsen, supra note 12, at 78.
176. See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32, 32 (1999). For the first time,
the Court found a respondent state to be guilty of torture. See Case of Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No.
21987/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996-VI 18 (1996).
177. Based on search in HUDOC Database of the European Court of Human Rights
(http://hudoc.echr .coe.int/).
178. Madsen, supra note 12, at 78.
179. Id.
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180

through the prism of the ECtHR. The bottom line was that the ECtHR could
not be regarded simply as an external phenomenon when it was invoked
continuously and successfully against French law and legal practice.
Ultimately at stake in France, as well as in many other European countries
during the 1990s, was whether to accept a new, much deeper national
implementation of the Convention. The impact of the ECtHR was no longer
limited to singular cases in Strasbourg; the Court began to transform more
broadly the interface of law and politics through an ever-close transnational
181
normative web. Due to the principle of monism of French constitutional law,
which automatically incorporates the country’s international obligations into
domestic legal law, the Convention had in principle been applicable
domestically from the state’s ratification of the Convention in 1974—although
this had little practical importance as individual petition was only accepted in
182
1981. In most other member states, this domestication of the Convention
183
required a specific legislative act. Throughout the 1990s, a growing number of
184
countries incorporated the Convention by legislative acts. The main reason
for this remarkable shift was arguably the general geopolitical zeitgeist, which
favored human rights and neoconstitutionalism both nationally and regionally.
With the incorporation of the ECHR into national law, the Convention
185
became embedded in a substantially different way, which implied that
national courts could apply the Convention. That domestic courts could apply
the Convention almost immediately produced a significant growth in domestic
suits that invoked Convention rights and freedoms, which in turn prompted
186
more petitions to be filed with the Court. The package implemented by
national institutions was not only the Convention and national cases that were
lost in Strasbourg but also the developing acquis Strasbourgeois, that is, the
entire case law of the ECtHR to date. Countries with few or hardly any cases
187
through the late 1980s started having a more steady flow of cases to the Court.
But above all, there was massive growth in references to the Convention by
188
national lawyers and, to a lesser extent, judges. Institutionally, the ECtHR
became a de facto constitutional court for most member states because the
Convention—although in most dualist countries only having the status of
180. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, RAISONNER LA RAISON D'ÉTAT : VERS UNE EUROPE DES
DROITS DE L’HOMME 18 (1989) (arguing that there is a fundamental clash between the objectives of the
ECHR and the craving of national sovereignty and difference in the member states).
181. See supra fig. 3.
182. See, e.g., Lambert Abdelgawad & Weber, supra note 167, at 115–16 (explaining the limited
effect of the Convention because of French courts’ refusal to review the compatability of French
domstic law with regard to the ECHR).
183. For an overview, see HELEN KELLER & ALEC STONE SWEET, A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE
IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (1998).
184. Id.
185. See Helfer, supra note 147.
186. Id.
187. See infra apps. 1 & 2.
188. See generally Madsen, supra note 125.
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statutory law—effectively governed human rights at a transnational
189
constitutional level.
Viewed cumulatively, these trends transformed the undertaking of
European human rights, making the Strasbourg system more akin to EU law:
190
directly applicable and with supreme status. This striking development also
changed how different constituencies engaged with the Court. The combined
effects of the institutionalization of European human rights law in state
bureaucracies, academic programs, and the portfolio of lawyers made European
191
human rights an integral part of public and constitutional law across Europe.
Consequently, the ECtHR gained extensive authority in the vast majority of
European countries and became part of the deep constitutional structure of
national legal orders. The only real exceptions to this trend were Turkey and
perhaps Italy, which were harbingers of the trouble the ECtHR would face in
the following decade.
B. From Protocol No. 11 to Backlash (2000–2014): New Directions for
European Human Rights?
As the new democracies of Eastern Europe were gradually accepted into
the Council of Europe during the 1990s and early 2000s, the ECtHR was on a
course of increased activity and potential case overload in its role as a de facto
constitutional court of European human rights. The effect of new member
states on the Court’s output in terms of the number of judgments was not
192
registered until approximately 2005. However, the rapidly growing number of
applications from new member states, which put the system under stress, was
193
detectable before that. In light of the original Cold War objectives of the
Convention, the accession of Russia to the Convention in 1998 was highly
symbolic and was seen by many as a strong indication of the system’s success
194
despite skepticism among some founding members.
Initially, Russia’s entrance had no significant impact. Most of the first
applications—approximately 2,000 applications until 2001—were rejected as
195
inadmissible, often on technical grounds. Only after 2004 did the Court
196
deliver a number of high-profile judgments against Russia.
Almost
immediately thereafter, problems with Russian compliance and political
189. Compare this to the Huneeus argument that neoconstitutionalism was central to human rights
in Latin America. See generally Alexandra Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American
Court’s Varied Authority, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 179.
190. See Helfer, supra note 147.
191. See, e.g., STEPHANIE HENNETTE-VAUCHEC & JEAN-MARC SOREL, LES DROITS DE L’HOMME
ONT-ILS CONSTITUTIONNALISE LE MONDE? (2011); NEIL WALKER, JO SHAW & STEPHEN TIERNEY,
EUROPE’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOSAIC (2011).
192. See supra fig. 3.
193. See infra app. 2.
194. Id.
195. Pamela A Jordan, Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe
and Compliance with Human Rights Norms, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 660, 681 (2003).
196. Id.
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discontent arose. Figure 5 indicates in each column the percentage of overall
judgments with Russia as respondent and other respondent states that
frequently appeared before the Court. It only includes the most regular
litigators from Eastern and Western Europe. The percentage of Russian
judgments grew steadily over the period, ending at about fifteen percent of the
198
total amount of judgments. Several other new member states, for example
199
Ukraine, also count for a significant percentage of total number of judgments.
Figure 5

Judgments Delivered per Year (1999−2014)
1800
1560 1543 1624
1503
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400
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844
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177

Russia
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Figure 5 further reveals that the vast growth in decided cases cannot be
explained simply by the entrance to the ECtHR of new member states with
structural human rights problems. In other words, it is wrong to allocate the
transformation in the level of output to only the geopolitical transformation and
corresponding additions of member states such as Russia; existing members
with structural problems—notably Italy and Turkey—also count for substantial
200
percentages of ECtHR judgments. Yet a dramatic change is visible in the
201
growing total number of judgments delivered. This change is arguably due to
both the institutional changes introduced by Protocol No. 11 and the doubling
of the number of member states. Moreover, the change is arguably in part the
197. Id. at 682.
198. For details, see infra app. 2, where the precise calculations are found.
199. Id.
200. See fig. 5.
201. See also fig. 3 supra and explanations of the relative decline after 2009 through 2010 as a result
of joining applications as single judgments.
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product of the growth model implicit in the expansive interpretive approach of
the ECtHR developed in the context of a limited caseload discussed above, but
now applied in a context of a rapidly expanding caseload in Strasbourg.
Protocol No. 11 was an attempt at rationalizing the operation of the Court in
light of a growing backlog of cases. The reform fit well with the pattern of
previous overhauls of the system: in every reform of the ECHR system since
1950—including all the additional Protocols No. 1 through 14bis from 1952
202
through 2009 —the member states have chosen either to expand the Court’s
jurisdiction or to introduce various technical changes to enhance its capability
203
and capacity to carry out its function. There were, however, signs that
technical rationalization was inadequate to resolve the new problems faced by
the Court. For example, Russia had broken rank in initially refusing to join
Protocol No. 14 in 2004, which was drafted to reduce the backlog by giving
single judges and three-member panels the power to quickly dispose of
204
meritless complaints. Russia’s relations with the Court steadily deteriorated
from 2004 on; the Duma continuously refused ratification of Protocol No. 14
205
until 2010.
Though the functioning of the Court had long been considered a matter of
technical rationalization, the British offensive with the leaked Draft Declaration
before the 2012 Brighton Summit further underscored that the power of the
206
ECtHR was no longer beyond political debate. The subsequent Brighton
Declaration stands out in comparison with earlier reforms for two reasons: It
identified measures for further rationalization of the ECtHR, and it openly
raised the political question of the future role of the Court with a series of
207
negative comments on the quality of the judges and their judgments.
Subsequent Protocols Numbers 15 and 16 were explicitly designed to rebalance
208
the system in favor of national levels of law and politics, although the actual
209
contents of these Protocols also indicate the Court’s empowerment.
Although these reforms emphasized reducing the backlog of cases, the
reforms also marked the beginning of what could appear as an odd, informal

202. See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21, at 239; see also Harmsen, supra note 151, at
120.
203. See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21, at 237.
204. Harmsen, supra note 151, at 126–32.
205. With regard to the Court, it was notably the victories of Chechen applicants in, for example,
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, App. No. 36378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) and then Ilaşcu
and Others v. Moldova and Russia App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), about Russia’s role in the
breakaway region of Transdniestria, that caused frictions with Moscow. The war between Russia and
Georgia, the first ever between two CoE member states, only added to the deteriorating of relations.
See LAURI MÄLKSOO, RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN HUMAN-RIGHTS LAW: THE RISE OF THE
CIVILIZATIONAL ARGUMENT (2014).
206. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 22.
207. BRIGHTON DECLARATION, supra note 22, ¶¶ 23, 25c.
208. See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21, at 241.
209. See id.; Helfer, supra note 22 (arguing that the Brighton Declaration points toward more
possible futures of the Court).
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alliance between the United Kingdom and Russia. These two countries had in
common that they were the most outspoken critics of the Court. This “alliance”
was illustrative of growing discontent with the ECtHR that united critiques
from governments and civil society facing Eastern and Western Europe’s
starkly different human rights situations.
The United Kingdom’s volte face with regard to the Court is striking.
Throughout the 1990s, human rights were embedded into the fabric of British
society through New Labour’s attempt at making human rights culture the
210
ethos of multicultural Britain. The Human Rights Act of 1998 was thus a
crowning moment that transformed the domestic legal status of human rights
211
and started constitutionalizing British human rights law.
The British
turnaround to become critical of the ECtHR occurred in the aftermath on the
War on Terror, when the Court—to Britain’s outrage—stopped deportation of
212
some radical Islamists and terrorists. Other more technical cases caused
213
additional political uproar, including Vinters and Others v. United Kingdom,
on the possibility of appeals of life sentences, and Hirst (No. II) v. United
214
Kingdom, finding that a blanket ban on voting by British prisoners violated
the Convention.
Although Britain had been found to have violated the Convention in
numerous comparably technical cases in years past, the political outrage in
Vinters and Hirst stemmed from the ECtHR’s foray into a deeply polarized
political arena. The ECtHR’s involvement in the cases was under intense media
coverage that portrayed the Court as effectively overruling legitimate
democratic British political decisions and the doctrine of Parliamentary
215
Supremacy.
The Hirst case has generated an ongoing tug-of-war between judges in
Strasbourg and British officials and politicians. Currently, there is open
noncompliance with the Hirst decision and Britain has another twenty-six cases
pending before the Committee of Ministers, the CoE body monitoring
216
compliance with judgments. And although Margaret Thatcher previously told
the Court to pull back, Prime Minister David Cameron is now threatening more
dramatic action: to pull Britain from the Convention altogether.
210. See Madsen, supra note 12, at 82–84 (demonstrating how human rights became part of
mainstream politics and culture).
211. Christopher McCrudden, Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 499, 503–05 (2000).
212. See, e.g., Conor Gearty, 11 September 2001, Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act, 32 J.
L. & SOC. 18, 29 (2005).
213. See generally Case of Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 66069/09; 130/10;
3896/10 (2013).
214. Hirst v. The United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
215. See, e.g., David Davis, Britain Must Defy the European Court of Human Rights on Prisoner
Voting as Strasbourg is Exceeding Its Authority, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ITS DISCONTENTS: TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH 65 (Spyridon Flogaitis et al. eds., 2013).
216. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, Supervision of the Execution of
Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,7 ANN. REP.1, 100 (2013).
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The ECtHR has responded to Britain’s pushback with some hesitation in its
217
subsequent jurisprudence. For example, in Scoppola v. Italy, the Court
allowed for depriving prisoners of voting rights if there is a legitimate aim and
deprivation is not automatic. But this hesitation is not driving all of the Court’s
218
decisions. In McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, the Court reasserted
that a blanket ban on prisoners’ voting rights constituted a violation. The
Court’s vacillation regarding Hirst is readily apparent: while the ECtHR is
seemingly seeking to retreat in Scoppola from an overreach in Hirst, Britain has
not budged on Hirst, and it intervened very strongly in Scoppola against Hirst.
This British pushback in the courtroom, the media, and at the political level
may be paying off as the ECtHR is now, seemingly, granting the United
Kingdom a wider margin of appreciation—that is, it gives more deference to
219
national decisions. As suggested by one ECtHR judge, the new conciliatory
approach moves emphasis from substantial individual justice to more abstract
220
procedural justice. If the member state can document that it has conducted a
transparent review of the problem and the relevant ECtHR case law, and has
involved the relevant actors, the ECtHR will be less likely to overrule the
221
state’s decision.
Although the Court’s retreat has been described as
222
“qualitative, democracy-enhancing” in the member states, in light of the
present analysis it would seem more appropriate to assert that the retreat’s
main purpose is most likely to find a means that is authority-enhancing for the
Court in the context of its tense interface with the United Kingdom.
Consequently, the rights-oriented jurisprudence that became the Court’s
trademark in the late 1970s is being supplemented, or replaced, by new forms of
strategic judging reminiscent of the legal diplomacy of the early ECtHR.
Compared to the United Kingdom, the situation in Russia is completely
different. On one hand, Russia exemplifies the problem of structural human
rights violations that are also visible in a number of other new member states.
There are endemic and unsolved problems with due process, police brutality,
223
prison conditions, and freedom of the press, as well as other rights. As of 2014,
Russia has been the subject of 1,604 cases, and the Court found a violation in all

217. See generally Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
218. See generally McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 51987/08 and 1,014
others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015).
219. See, e.g., MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App No. 39401/04, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 66 (2011); see
also ODDNÝ MJÖLL ARNARDÓTTIR, RETHINKING THE TWO MARGINS OF APPRECIATION (2014)
(demonstrating how such a change in appraoch is arguably taking place).
220. See Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of Human Rights?: Strasbourg in the Age of
Subsidiarity, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 499 (2014).
221. See, e.g., RMT v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31045/10, 366 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), Animal
Defenders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48876/08, 57 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (2013), and A, B and C v.
Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
222. Spano, supra note 220.
223. See Violations by Article and by State 1959-2014, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS. (2015),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2014_ENG.pdf.
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224

but seventy-four. Comparatively, in the same period, Ukraine appeared in
1,002 cases and only in ten were violations not found. Poland appeared in 1,070
225
cases and nonviolation was found in 107 of them. Resembling the situation of
Italy and Turkey, the rulings of the ECtHR with regard to a number of new
member states seem not to solve the human rights problems at hand but instead
highlight them and spur mobilization toward the Court, which engenders
further backlog and political tensions.
Yet Russia is an exceptional case. The fact that the country has been
involved in numerous violent military disputes over territory has raised
unprecedented issues relating to interstate conflict—earlier interstate
complaints in the Cyprus, Greece, Northern Ireland, and Turkey cases never
226
involved interstate war among member states. The Russo–Georgian War in
2008 prompted not only an interstate complaint but also many individual
227
applications. Likewise, the Chechen–Russian conflict produced numerous
228
individual applications. Most recently, the Russo–Ukrainian warfare has
229
trigged an interstate complaint. The Strasbourg system was never set up with
230
such situations in mind. Though the Court overcame significant challenges as
an instrument of democratization—witnessed in numerous cases from Eastern
231
Europe and earlier, in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, it has been an ineffective
232
tool for promoting democracy in warlike conditions. As a result of Russia’s
contentious relationship with the Court, it is the odd man out. For example,
although Russia has an accredited delegation in Strasbourg, its right to vote and
to be represented in the Parliamentary Assembly’s main bodies has been
233
suspended. Further, Russia has both been threatened with expulsion and has
234
threatened to leave the CoE multiple times since 2000.
These examples of pushback from the United Kingdom and Russia are not
the only signs of increasing challenges to the ECtHR’s authority. As recent
reports from the Committee of Ministers have shown, compliance rates are
235
declining, and most countries are now subject to compliance monitoring. The
authority of the ECtHR, as argued by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen, is in part a
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
227. See, e.g., Georgia v. Russia (No. 1), App. No. 13255/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Georgia v. Russia
(No. 2), Appl. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); and Georgia v. Russia (No. 3) Appl. No. 61186/09,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
228. DOTHAN, supra note 17, at 255.
229. Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20958/1, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).
230. The original idea was precisely to intervene before such situations occurred. See generally
Bates, supra note 1.
231. SWEENEY, supra note 145.
232. See generally Réne Provost, Teetering on the Edge of Legal Nihilism: Russia and the Evolving
European Human Rights Regime, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 289 (2015).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. For details, see infra fig. 6.
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kind of compliance. Where the state response is typically limited to paying
damages without further implementation of judgments—in Russia, for
241
instance—this challenges narrow authority. Where the states are seeking a
dialogue and have demonstrated willingness to reform—Poland, for example—
242
this is not necessarily detrimental to narrow authority. It is clear that the
Court’s narrow authority varies even among member states with structural
problems. Although the Court has little narrow authority in Russia, the reverse
situation exists for the Court in Poland and many other new member states
engaging with the Court and Committee of Ministers to find solutions to
structural problems.
In addition to member states’ consequential steps toward giving full effect to
the Court’s rulings, the other closely related criteria for assessing the ECtHR’s
authority suggested by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen is recognition by
243
constituencies. Member states’ rhetoric, increasingly critical of the Court, is
salient in this regard. Although this discourse of discontent is rooted in very
different legal and political circumstances from one country to another, these
differences seem lost on many commentators. In fact, one can observe a
diffusion of critical discourse: critics from countries with comparatively few
cases in Strasbourg—such as Denmark and Finland—adopt the very same
244
discursive means as states facing more serious challenges from Strasbourg. In
the legal field, highly critical voices speak out in every single European state.
Even presidents of national supreme courts are openly voicing their opposition
to the ECtHR—most recently, the Supreme Court Presidents from the United
245
Kingdom, Belgium, and Finland. Although bashing the ECtHR is not new,
the generalization of the discourse across Europe and its application to very
different human rights situations is quite novel. The United Kingdom’s current
government does stand out, however, even from previous U.K. governments
with its threat of leaving the ECHR; Russia is in part already ousted from the
CoE. Most other member states, however, are not seeking such radical breaks
with Strasbourg.
Compared to the discourse of discontent, the Brighton Declaration, adopted
by consensus, provides a different but more robust empirical indicator of the

241. See DOTHAN, supra note 17, at 255.
242. Id. at 237–38.
243. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5.
244. These statements are typically made at unrecorded seminars and less so in written material.
See however, the statements by English Law Lords in Owen Bowcott, European Court is not Superior
to UK Supreme Court, says Lord Judge, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com
/law/2013/dec/04/european-court-uk-supreme-lord-judge, and Owen Bowcott, Senior Judge: European
Court of Human Rights Undermining Democratic Process, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 28, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/28/european-court-of-human-rights.
245. See Bowcott, supra note 244 for English judges; for Belgium see MARC J. BOSSUYT,
STRASBOURG ET LEASE DEMANDEUS D’ASILE: DES JUGES SUR UN TERRAIN GLISSANT (2010); for
Finland see Pauline Koskelo, Domare, lagstiftare och professorer, SVJT 619, 620–41 (2014). See
generally SPYRIDON FLOGAITIS, TOM ZWART & JULIE FRASER, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS: TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH (2013).
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general recognition of the ECtHR by key constituencies—the member states’
246
governments. Importantly, at no point does the Declaration suggest reducing
247
Convention rights or the acquis of Strasbourg. Although the Brighton
Declaration is not limiting the Court’s subject-matter authority, it is
nevertheless seeking to limit its future role in defining that authority by giving
248
more power to national institutions. Nothing is fixed at the moment, and
much probably depends on the Court’s ability to reduce the backlog of cases
249
and implement reforms. The Declaration mainly seeks a different balance
between the Court and the member states. But this unsolved balance between
national and European human rights law creates a new uncertainty in the
system where the Court seems to be seeking the approval of the constituencies.
This rebalancing of the system—between law and politics and between the
international and the national—might best be understood as an indicator of new
250
fragility in the system. This fragility is apparent in the described efforts by the
United Kingdom and Russia to reduce the ECtHR’s power over domestic
matters. The very recent case law giving more leeway to member states is
probably the first empirical indication of this decline of power of the ECtHR.
But as suggested by Alter, Helfer and Madsen, power and authority are to be
treated as two distinct phenomena. Following Alter, Helfer and Madsen’s
framework, the Court’s power is currently challenged, but its overall authority
is generally sustained, at least for the time being.
IV
CONCLUSION
Not long ago, the ECtHR was heralded as “one of the most remarkable
phenomena in the history of international law, perhaps in the history of all
251
law.” Since the Brighton Declaration, Europeans have become accustomed to
a different kind of discourse where both the judgments and the judges are
scolded by fuming heads of states, members of the press, and senior members of
the legal profession. As suggested, however, this new critical discourse is not
necessarily a sign of shrinking ECtHR authority. Underneath this discourse lies
an uneven human rights landscape with some member states facing very
different challenges—qualitatively and quantitatively—in giving effect to the
252
European Convention. Although this article does not exhaustively analyze all
246. See BRIGHTON DECLARATION, supra note 22.
247. CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21 (arguing that the Brighton Declaration only
suggests rebalancing the relationship between nationa and European law and politics).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 248.
250. But see Gregory C. Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile)
Authority of the WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 267.
251. Michael O Boyle, On Reforming the Operation of the European Court of Human Rights, 1
EUR. HUM. RTS L. REV. 1 (2008).
252. But see FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE. CHALLENGES AND
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2014) (arguing that some member states are
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forty-seven member states, it is clear from the case studies examined here that
the most serious challenges to the Court’s authority are concentrated in some
member states, notably the United Kingdom and Russia.
The United Kingdom and Russia, although having fueled broader public
discontent with the Court, might be outliers in the bigger picture, however.
Despite these member states’ fundamentally different human rights situations,
they both move away from European consensus on human rights and the
European integration project more generally. The United Kingdom’s projects,
on one hand, have recently included threats of leaving the Convention and even
the EU. And Russia, on the other hand, is pursuing the rise of the BRICs as an
alternative way of restoring its power and threatening its flight from the CoE.
These broader changes in the behavior of two important member states
cannot be explained simply as a response to the quality of the rulings or the
judges of the ECtHR. Instead, the change in behavior is a reflection of the
transformation in the broader geopolitical contexts in which both the member
states and the Court operates. The post–Cold War period catalyzed the Court’s
rapid growth and an ideological demand for its services to democratize Eastern
Europe. The current geopolitical situation has different demands. Although the
“post–post Cold War” era has competing origins—the rise of China, 9/11 and
the fight against terrorism, the financial crisis and resulting crisis in the
European project and economy, et cetera—the era has resulted in new
cleavages in Europe, including in the area of human rights. Specifically, there
are indications, notably regarding to the ongoing conflict between Russia and
Ukraine, that the boundary of Europe is being redrawn both geographically and
symbolically. At the same time the United Kingdom is championing a different
balance between national and European law and politics of human rights. There
is nothing new in the fact that geopolitics prompts change in the delineation of
liberal Europe and its commitment to human rights. On the contrary, as
suggested by this analysis of the long-term evolution of the ECtHR, geopolitical
transformations have consistently impacted the operation of the Court: Cold
War, decolonization, détente, and the post–Cold War. The current geopolitical
transformation will also—if it has not already—impact the authority of the
ECtHR. What is uncertain, however, is the precise direction of that change.
What we can observe right now is form of boundary politics of the space
regulated by the ECHR both with regard to its geographical reach and its
impact on the national level of law and politics. The question remains what
impact that will have on the authority of the Court in the long run.

consistly under the common threshold, while others face very few problems).

MADSEN_2-8 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2016]

2/8/2016 7:22 PM

THE CHALLENGING AUTHORITY OF THE ECTHR

177

Appendix 1: Select Member States’ Percentage of Total Output of Judgments
Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Moldova
Netherlands
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United
Kingdom
Other

1.69 3.02 2.03 2.37 2.70 2.37 1.99 1.35 1.53 0.91 0.92 1.27 1.04 2.10 1.64 0.79
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
1.13 0.29 0.56 1.66 1.14 2.09 1.27 0.45 1.00 0.91 0.68 0.27 0.78 0.55 0.98 2.13
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.56 0.43 0.34 0.36 1.56 3.76 2.08 2.88 3.53 3.82 3.88 5.40 5.35 5.86 2.84 2.02
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.00 0.00 0.56 1.07 0.85 4.60 2.35 1.41 2.06 1.23 1.17 1.40 2.16 2.10 2.62 3.03
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.00 0.86 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.42 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.52 0.09 0.00 0.22
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
12.99 10.50 5.07 8.89 13.37 10.45 5.52 6.15 3.19 2.20 2.03 2.80 2.85 2.65 3.93 2.47
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
1.69 0.43 2.03 1.07 1.71 0.84 1.45 0.64 0.80 0.65 1.29 2.40 3.54 2.10 0.66 1.46
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
3.39 3.02 2.36 2.96 3.98 5.85 9.50 3.53 4.32 4.80 4.62 3.74 6.30 5.12 4.15 6.06
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.56 0.14 0.34 0.36 2.28 2.79 1.54 2.05 1.60 2.85 1.85 1.40 2.94 2.38 4.59 5.61
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
40.11 56.98 46.85 46.45 21.05 6.69 7.15 6.60 4.46 5.44 4.25 6.60 3.89 5.76 4.26 4.94
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.39 1.27 1.28 3.99 2.14 1.85 1.87 2.68 2.47 2.07 2.69
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
1.13 0.86 0.79 1.30 1.00 1.39 0.90 0.45 0.67 0.06 0.25 0.27 0.52 0.64 0.11 0.34
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
1.69 2.73 2.25 3.08 9.53 11.00 4.43 7.37 7.39 9.14 8.19 7.14 6.13 6.77 2.51 3.14
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
1.13 0.43 0.11 3.20 3.98 2.65 2.99 4.68 6.19 12.90 10.34 9.54 5.87 7.23 9.61 9.76
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.71 2.09 7.51 6.54 12.77 15.88 13.49 14.48 11.49 12.26 14.08 14.48
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
1.13 0.86 0.90 0.83 3.84 1.95 2.62 2.24 1.53 0.97 2.40 2.67 1.81 2.10 1.75 1.57
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.00 0.29 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.09 12.18 1.00 0.58 0.49 0.40 1.04 2.01 2.73 3.48
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.00 1.01 0.90 0.59 0.14 0.00 0.45 0.58 0.47 0.26 0.43 0.73 0.95 0.73 1.42 2.02
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
10.73 5.76 25.79 12.44 17.64 23.96 26.24 21.41 22.02 17.11 21.92 18.55 15.11 11.25 13.54 11.34
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
0.00 0.00 0.11 0.12 1.00 1.95 10.86 7.69 7.25 7.13 7.76 7.27 9.07 6.50 7.53 4.49
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
7.91
%

4.32
%

3.83
%

4.74
%

3.56
%

3.34
%

1.63
%

1.47
%

3.33
%

14.12
%

8.06
%

4.73
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Appendix 2: Number of Applications Allocated to a Judicial Formation per
Year
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